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A Metaphysical Consideration of Nature. 
Introduction . 
Philosophy offers one of t he most 
fertile fields for research work, but yet 
one of many difficulties. To enumerate the 
difficultie~ would i mply a survey of the 
whole history of philosophy, and in the end 
~ia s the main pro blem of philosophical inv-
estigation. It is necessary to keep ever in 
view that the business of philoso?hY is to 
interpret experienc~,~hich involves the fact ,I 
that the human mind must strive to systemat~ 11 
ically formulate all the rational principles 
underlying this same experience. There is the 
temptation however,to confine all philosophy 
to "Metaphys j_cs" or even to "logic", and con-
clude that the whole study is one for idle 
moments or merely a matter of mental eymnas-
tics. But su ch a conception presupposes pure 
ignorance , and an unscientific preparation on 
the part of the one entertaining it. . 
Philosophy cannot be learned in 
a day. Many of its difficulties seem insur-
mountable, but all we can do is to investi-
gate and clear away as many as possible, not 
as an end in itself, but as a step preparatory 
to their remcval after~ards. True it is, phil-
osophy has had to wage a fierce warfare down 
throueh the centuries, and even now the battle 
is zoing on, but it is on the winning side, in 
fact it is in correlation with the whole field 
of scientific investigation. 
All the zreat s ysten1s of the r>ast have ari sen 
from. the r esult o f <luestionines and a sceptical 
at titude on the :part of those \rho we1 .. e not dis-
:::.:-os ed to acce1)t ~verything as true~ The Socratic 
phi .oso:phy \'ras due to the scepticism of the Sorh~ , 
ists : the Patr isti c thoueht had its rise in the 
att acks on Christianity by its e nemies. Kant • s 
ereat work was t he result of d issatisfaction on 
his part , with the French materialistic thou ght . 
of his day* a s wel l as Hume ' s sceptici sm. I 
But if s cert icism is not sat- ~ 
isfact ory , it has an irrtportant raiss ion , i.e. of · a\i~.ken ·.ne a nd stimulatine t he human 1.11ind to ere at - 1
1 
er activity and earnes tness. 
The outlook for :philosophy is brieht , j 
the situation i s e rmvine more hopeful. The prob-
lem of life and r e al it y is with us yet as it was '11 
vri th. the earJ y Greel<:s , but t o- day vritL all its I 
v ast accumulat i on of facts , the human mind is bet- ' 
t ~?.r able to deal v:rith tld.s same l'rob1em. 
Present tendencies in all invest -
igat icn , are en the whole met a physical.. I n the 
1orld of Physics, each new fact ascertained by 
t.1. e scientist and his theory forme d on the basis 
of these facts , :r~resu:> ::;>ose a rnetaphys i cal hypoth-
esis. I n fact . after the scientist haa constructed ! 
hts edifice of facts , he must believe i n thej.r \1 
r:tet aphys ical reaJ. i ty or his work i~;: vain. 
Many are the schoo l s of modern intellect-
ual act tv i t y, but in the rna in the coFJ.L10n problem 
of Nature stands out prominent l y in every school • 
• 
3. CHAPTER. I. 
A metaph.ys ical cons i de rat i on ' 'f Nature at 
t he outset, implies a definition of the term 
" Nature", which may have many meanings . We 
may consider Nat ure as the sum-total of all 
ph~sdna~ .phenomena, i ncluding everything or-
ganic or i noreanic. On the other hand, more 
than physical phenomena may be included. The 
human body may be implied, or if we consider 
t he universe as a dualism of mind and m.attor 
we are apt to define Natur~ as that which is 
outside of mind. We will s imply view Nature 
as the world. without, all t .hat i s a:Jart from 
man and h i s works. 
As thinking beings, we s t and I 
~n a_ world of wonder . We ack~owledge that_Nature 11 
1s 1mmense, as well as our 1gnorance of 1t: 1 
that it is far gre ater than any concept ion '\'fc 1 
may have of it also. It is evident that every-
where in this great system of Nature .. t here is 
developement.It never remains in a finishe d 
state. So we are mere children of Nature: we 1 
have grown up wit h it, so much s o t hat holding I 
it up before us as a mirror, we have no trouble 
1
1 
i n beholdi ng ourselves as a ve r y part of it. In 
fa ct vre might say that Nature is our Mother. 
Standing then with OJen mi nd, we 
ar e impressed wit h its vastnes s. Our ance stors 
were truly thrilled and inspired ev en to ¥rors h i p 1: 
~Y its beauty, and in their own simple way stood U 
st ill and wo ndered at the bo undless unfat homable j 
sea, t he mount ains as they lifted t he ir proud 
heads up through t !>.e clou ds to the cpen sky abovd 
To-da! we ~re en~ o~ing t he results of res earc h , j 
for t !lese 1m..ruensJ. t 1es have to some extent been 
measured. The universe is being rev ealed to us 
now as full of life. In the ancient days 
Aristotl e recorded a total of five hundred 
animals, but to-day the roll-call of anim.- j 
als includes tens of thousands of species, 
in fact as we count the stars by thousands \ 
so we count the forms of life. We can truly I 
say with Goethe, i n re gard to t he wealth of 11~ Nature t hat 11 In floods of life, in a st c, r m 
I 
of activity, she moves and works above and 1 beneath, working and weaving, an endless j 
motion, birth and deatlt , an infinite ocean, 
a chan~eful web, a glowing life: s he plies I 
at the roaring loom of time and \Teaves a 
liv ing garment ' &r God 11 • But in spite of all 
5a:t;ure':s multiplicity and immensities, we 
are permitted to see. before us an a11- per-
vading order or Cosmos, and it is this Cosmcs 
which engages our attention now .. 
At the first when man became a 
thinking creature, Nature presented to him 
its problems, gradually leading him from the 
practical eve r y-day life off into the abstract ' 
On one side then, is man the inquirer, asking 1j 
the " why and the whither 11 , and on the other 
side is Nature lying all before him, inviting ~1.1 him to investigate its meaning. 
Far back in the earliest 
st age of philosophic thinking, especially in 
the Cosmological period of Greek thought, we 
find that t he chief characteristic was the 
formation of scientific conceptions arising 
from a " disinterested study of Nature ". 
Greek science gave itself wholly up to the 
solution of all the problems, which Nature 
presented, and it was this devotion to such 
research work, t hat originated the forms of 
1 
I 
I 
,, 
,-
0. 
thought in the explanation of the external 
world, a~ well as laying the foundation of 
et hies. 
Naturally these early Greek ~hiloso­
phers on account of their different interp-
retations, were divided into schools, each 
schccl proceeding along its own particular 
_line of investigation. But in the main , the~r 
agreed in their search after primary causes, 
or the original ground of thines abidine 
through all changes , a nd having the power to 
change itself into the particular, and back 
again into itself . They sought after the 
"tl!/&tfiY", thereby interesting scientific 
thought more in met aphysical conceptions 
than in physical facts.In all their investis-
at ions how·ever, the main feature was the nee- 1 
essity of an "d
1
o[_tf 11 or principle, the setting I 
over a.e;ainst dead matter a living moving force, 
1 
all of which endeavour resulted in the emergence 
of a teleological view of Nature. Throughout 
the universe en abidine order was obse r vc-J , 
·I th0 rr1ain contribution bc- ir1g eiven by the study 
I 
of Astronomy. In the observance of this order, 1 
all the proc;essen·:. c5f :n-ature· .were :·conceived .as 
being inteliigible. Philoso phy truly had its 
rise then, in the investigation of natural phen~ 
omena, or as Weber says, " Philosoph~r dates her 
origin from the day when these " physicians .. , 
as Aristotle calls them in distinct ion from 
their predecessors, the theoloeians, releeated 
the traditional gods to the domain of fable, 
and explained Nature by principles and causes " 
---=-- --=----
6. 
We have already stated, what we mean by the 
term " Nature"w By so doing, we only wish to 
differentiate Nature from man, physicalJy and 
morally, and hence arise many queries as to the 
meanine of tlLis outer world wh ich we distinguish 
from man abd his works. We naturally enquire 
whether we are living in a world of appearance 
I 
I 
I 
only, or are all these phenomena simply the 
1 
expressions of a Hi ghe r Power or Ultimate Cause 
behind them all. In the main, there are two dir- I 
ections which philosophy has taken and still 
takes in any discussion of t hese :;henomc na, viz. 
Naturalism, whi ch conceives the universe as a 
vast mechanism, complete in itself, sup?lyine 
its own motive-power, its own cause , and inde-
pendent of any outside force, and " Ideali sm ", 
wh ich posits an ultimate cause, a Prime-Mover 
or God, as t he explanation of all natural phen-
omena, the~eby conceiving Nature as Ward says, 
as a system, whose ::_:Jarts s imr,le ·. or com? lex, are 
who lly determined by universal laws , and one 
which is hypothetical awaiting ver i ficat ion. 
Both Naturalism an d Idealism, .claim natural 
laws as governing princi ples, but in Natural ism 
these laws are heJ. ~. to be dynamic in their 
nature, and so to explain this vast mechanism 
c-f Nature, vre must l ook to t hese lavrs or force s 
which alone reveal the secrets of the power of 
this mecl:.anism. 
Proceeding then to examine 
Nature as a system, we must presuppose a fund-
amental postulate, concerning the validity of 
of all human knowled:e of such a system. The 
postulate is t his, that if we would understand 
Nature we must understand the r elation of this 
world to the mind. This was the main feature 
7 . 
and contribution of the ~latonic philosophy , 
and t o carry out this relation , was the t ask 
which Kant s et for himself . He aimed to present I 
t Le fact , that if we would form a rational con-
cept ion of the world• it should never be fo r eot- '· 
ten that the facts of the world vrere but fact s 
for self-consciousness , and t heir investieation 
by the s cientist , implied the possibility of 
- ~~ing comprehende d by a self-conscious SJirit 
rhich is man . The krrowl edee of all the materi al 1 
fa ct s presup~oses that these same facts can ent- ~ 
er into organic union with an intellieence wh ich ~ 
is self- conscious. Th is means that mind must be 
viewed as an activ ity , whose business is to 11 
work ave~ all the im~ressicns f urnished it by , 
the sensibilit ~r 1 s yst ematizine them into a rat- 'I 
ional whole whi ch is knowl e dge. Tl1is concepticn 
of mind i::l. nt e dates the underst an.cHn rr of the worl d. 1 
. ,. "~- f ' • 1 d ' ~ , . . I J. n wrcl c 11 we _ 1no cu r se. ves • an 11en ce we o.1sr J.s s 11 
ulJ ideas of ~aosivity as Locke anc Hu. rne advo c-
~t c d. The condition of a s c · entjf i c study of 
Natu r e i s therefore. the cons id~ration of the 
ros s ib i lity of knowledge itself . This postulate 
viz. U1e fr ee a.ctivit y of mind , then clear :J the 
~l" ()l_i_!l d :e c) '!... a 1r1e·L o.~ i l 1 t;,rs :i. c \:t l \ r i e y.r ;. . f N ~ ~ L 1 ~ . ~~· (~ '1 ;3 c.. 
' ... ~ '.c·J. c- , iJ ~r descr ibing t~'.e object of the search ) 
as \~·e l.J. as la~rine do"!'/'n the Gondit i on!: c· f the 
:;:;oss ibility of that rhic l i s son~ht. 
Vl it h tJ , j.s l)ostul at e estublis hed , we cc.n now 
lllU }~ e prggress in our· cUs cuss i on of Nature. Hence i1 
t he first conception of Nature to be noticed , i s 
that of Naturalism , whi ch is grounde d i n the old 
Atomic philosophy of Leuci~pus and elaborat ed in l 
the great but ve ry imr:>ortant , cons ide ring the as , 
I 
II 
I' 
- -----
8. 
Work of his disciple Democritus, about the year 
420 B.C. He affirmed the homozeneity of all bod~ 
ie s . Matter was composed of infinitely small 
molecules, f alling together in space , sometimes , 
colliding with one another and then again sep-
ara t ing , these collisions resulting in the for-
mation of bodies, and their separation being 
destruction. All such molecules were infinite 
in number,and indivisible, as welJ. as possessine 
perpetual motion, which belonged to their very 
essence.Necessity governed the forc e mav ins , and 
henc e all pur::,ose and design had no meaning. A 
teleoloeical view of Nature was rul e d out, be-
cause all Nature simply happened, there beine 
no cause whatever, except reason and necessity. 
This in short vras the Atom ic theory, in 
which all modern at heistic materialism is 
grounded. To the naturalist then, Nature is a 
vast mechanism 'hich has run on for centuries 
and eons, and is liable to run for eons to 
come . When we ask the naturalist to explain 
phenomena, he puts forward the claim that they 
are the result of resident forces acting on 
~articles of matter. These forces must be dif-
ferent , for if they were the same in. essence 
as matter, there never could be movement or 
change , but when we l ook for organization, we 
f i nd none. Cause reduces to effect and effect 
t c cause. causality bei ng only a go ing back 
i n a circle until we come to our stCl.rtins-
point. Hence nothing new can be introduced in 
t he system of mechanism. Nature was always the 
same , a ri ~ id system eoverned by eternal iron 
law~ , the )rinci!Jle ·of necessity being the 
regulator of the whole universe. 
I 
~ 
Q 
'"' . 
Over against such a system of necessity 
is posit ~ d that cf I dealism , whi ch had its 
rise in t he philosophy of Plato. I n his 
thought, reality was immaterial and it was 
this immateriality which served as the ob j ect 
of ethical knowledge , and not simvly as a 
method of explaining phenomena. True Being 
was tc be foun d only in the idea which he 
described as that incor~or0 al Be ing which is 
knovn through ccnceptions. The idea was seif-
sufficient : the whole intelligible wc rld vras 
a s~rstem of beings which were perfect , but '1 
the transition from t he ideal to the real world 
vras made poss ible throve.h a concer)tion of the 
Div ine goodness. G6d was t he Supreme Goodne s s 
and being life itself. He therefore created 
life , which meant that the I dea re~roduced 
i t seJ.f. 
By so doing , the I dea got out of i t self. 
Thus I dea was the onJ.y reality, and everything · 11 
else was non- being \thich 1:ras that uhich I dea I 
formed resul ting in a finished whole vtsible 
to our senses , or in other words, matt er. This 
matter was incorporea1 but eternal , receiving 
f orm by the action of the I dea upon it. Thus 
1 
there were two entities a I de a and Mati..er. I de a 
vms the ere at ine force, and Matter was the con-
dition c·f t hat activit~r , The G6omos hEnc e had 
1
1 
its source in the union of the i e a or rJaterJ. 1 
nal pr inciple vrith the rnater·al Qr ·.mat~rnal I 
principle. and its final cause was the most 
perfect reulizatiob of this Idea of Go0d. 
Such a philosophy naturally 
o:J;?OSed the system of Atomism ·which dismisse d 
all finality. Pl ato ' s tho~ght assumed the 
u II f A (f b t b d . 1 "d nous c_ naxauoras ~ u y so ~1n~ e d 1 
10. 
• 
not reject physical causes: he sim~ly viewed 
t .em as subordinate to final cacses. 
What then did Platonic t1ought 
offer as its explanation of Nature ? It was 
this. All phenomena of Nature were to be vi ewed 
teleologically, i.e. t hat in all Nature there 
vras a purpose wc·rkini: itself out toward an End 
or "teJ.os ". Thi s directly OIJ:)osed the Atomic 
theory wh:L ch claiP1ed that all mover.~.ents j_n the 
universe vere mechanical r esultants of t he or-
iginal states of motion of individual atoms . 
Plato regarded the orde r ed mot ion of the univ-
erse as the primitive unit, viewing every change 
as resul tine from the determined whole. 
The teleological view of Nature was 
e laborated in Aristotle 'z philoso phy of Nature. 
He held that end or ~urpose was the directive 
:JrincirJle of Nature in all its activities, and 
that it pre-existed in princirle in all organ-
isns ~reduce~ by her. But even in a ccepting 
such ~ ~r inciple , he differe d from Plato in 
regard to the concept"on of Beine and Becomin~. 
Pl ato had posit ed two different worlds. I t was 
Aristotle ' s aim to remove all division , and to 
sl mr t 1e t!'u.e relation existing bet¥.e'2n the I dea 
and i ts ~hcnomenon. Thus in h i s ~re tit system of . 
Logic he gave to the thinking world the solution 
of the fundamental problem in Greek ph ilos o)hy, 
viz. how an ~biding Being or unitar y Be inz could 
be conceived as exist i ng behind changing phen-
omena. This he so lved by his conce ~t of relation 
viz. devel o2ement . He recognize d the fact that 
Atomism had sought to ~osit at oms and their 
mot ions, as well as that Plato had 2osited I deas 
and the·r final causes, but it rema ined fer him 
to explain the true reality as an essence which 
I' 
lL 
l 
continu~lly unfcld~ itself in phenomena . Being \1 
resolved itself then, into the s um-total of 
all phenomena in which it realized itself, o~ 1 
::;u enorJ.e nal appearance was t he e!Jscr..cc realiz,in~l 
it!J t:-ue self. The fundamental thought in I 
Aristotle • s concept ion of Nature v;as that all 'I 
cosmic procecces were the realization of the 1 
true essence according to teleological prin- I 
ci:;:Jles, resulting in all the or:::;anism:: cf life .
1 a. d the univers•2, The one g:L .. e uj Prime-Mover or 1 
Pure-Form was the Deity or G6d, and it was in 
::mch a Be ing that all possib ility becarJ.e actu-. 1 
ality. i 
The result of such thinking was a system 'j 
of spiritual rJ.onothe i sm in '"fhich rf as a God that) 
acted upon the world through a longing t i ~ at ·_ t h~l 
world had for Him. Matter became that 'UJ'hich 1 
WCl.s moved , but did not move anything else . God 11 
:as the only activity of the universe: Nature II 
then, !as a series between God and matter, a 
conncttdd sys t em of living beings wh ich must ~ 
be vi~ ued ·as a uni t~r in vrhich mat t er develo ::_ es 
from one state into anot her highe r , and ~ass-
1 
inz from form to form i s finally and potenti-
ally abso r bed by God. 
From Aris t otle 's t i me on to the Renai s J 
sance , no great cont ri bution t c a philoso phy I 
of Nature was made. When Vle collie to the . Rennai- I 
s sance howeverT we notice a return to the stud~ 
of Nature , and at the same time a de~arture 
from the Aristotelian S:;?iri tual izat ion of the II 
un iverse, mainly bec ause there had arisen the 
new princiDle of mechanics in which · 11 s piri t 
ual fo rce:: having any influence i n Natnre vrcre 
ruled out. Science could only sec in Nature 
the mGvemett of the smallest bodies, one be-y 
being the cause of the other, so that all tel~ 
l 
12. 
-eology was rejected. This rejection was well 
illustrated by Bacon •s assertion that teleology 
as a mcde of Nature,was an "idol". The tendency 
was to restrict philosophy to physics, dismissin~ 
all metaphysical speculation b:r claiming that if " 
the explanation of Nature involved efficient 
causes, then it was a matter of physics, and o'~ 
meta 'Jlwsics when final causes were at stake. _ 
... ~ 
But the scientific Hlovement v as 
£':L'.. ining ground , although it meant a vrar vri th the 
Church. Great discoveries were being made at the 
time. The Copernican system had been introduced 
and this tended· .. to r evolutionize all speculative 
thought by the discovery of a larger universe. 
New continents were discovered resultin~ i n a 
wider conception of the wo rld and its inhabitants ~ 
In this age , there was one philoso:pher Gior dano 
Bruno, who as a young man had joined the Domin-
ican order of monks , but with an intense admir-
ation of and love for Nature, he turned against 
monastic life , and gave himself up to a close 
study of Nature. For him the universe was infin-
ite , God and the universe were the same, but he 
drew the line between the world and the universe. 
Nature to h i m was alive and nothing in it could 
be destroyed, even death was only a tran:Jfor1,1at ionJ 
o f li f e. Without going into deta ils, we notice 
that the main featu re of his philosor)hy ras that 
he tegarded Nature as an organism and not a dead 
thing forever O??Csed to God who 1as its Pr ime-
Mover and Cause, although in his view of matter 
he showe d the impossibility of all natur~li=tic 
schemes to avoid an idealizing tendency. 
It is not until we come to Kant' :::: \iork 
that we arrive at any logical conclu~ions c ncer-
ning Nature and her me<:ming. Here we find the 
I 
I. 
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subjectivity of the human understanding firmly 
established, so t hat when the question of Nature 
is introduced in the Transcendental Analyti c, we 
are confronted with a definit ion of it , viz. a 
coherence of phenomena in t heir existence acco r -
ding to necessary rules or laws. These la\fs exist 
a priori mak ing Nature possible and pr esenting t o 
us :phenomena existing in one Nature. ThiS pre - "-··· 
~.~oses the possibility of a unity of experience 
a ) r iori, thus rescuing experience from being a 
!Il8l'e receptitjty of impressivns from an Ot~ter II 
world as Hume had taught. Hume ,in fa ct, had Aes-
t royed experience by reducing it down t o a mdtter 
of feelings which were wholly unreliable be cause I 
of their chaneeab ility . He made a'lrTay wi th his 11 
postulate of experience and with it went Nature. 
Besides Hume's system of thinking, Kant 
had to combat the French materi alism o f the timG. 1 
! -h is l)hilosophy in regard to Nature, a i me d t c - · 
d ismiss al l organization, le aving us with a sys-
tem of atom-complexes or organic molecules , whose 
activity according to mechanical laws opera"Ying 
on the exte r nal, explained all organic life. 
Against t h is, Kant advanc ed his work of "Natural 
History of the Heavens ", whe!!.'e he ]!OSited a dyn- II 
B!!lic t heory of matte r vlh ich claimed t hat the sub- ·, 
stance movable in s pace, was the product of two ~ 
f orces , ma intaining ·an equilibrium in a varyinc 
de gree , these forces being, attraction and rep; 
ulsion. But he did not l e ave us with the meta-
physics of phenomena only, for he pro ceeded to 
1 ift u.s up above t he duality of matter and mind 1 
so pr cminent in t he time of the Cartesian s chool , 
and revealed to us the fac t that t he worl d as 1
1 known t o us , was ccm2lete in itself, not of 
course inde,endent of mind, but prior to and 
independent of any conception we mi :..,ht h;_ve of it 
I 
= 
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The only reality of this world for us was in 
our ideas of it. This bears out his dictum viz. 
11 ~.1acht zwar der Verstand die Natur aber er 
schafft ' · ;:; ie nicht 11 i.e. the material consists 
of phenomena or data of sensibility eiven to us 
under the intuitional form s of SJ)ace and time. 
But such a theory would seem to imply 
a two-fold origin of Nature, which is quite un-
satisfactory. On the otiLhahd?f: ·J~ atute. ·might be 
conceived as a single system of experien~e orig-
inating wholl~ in the understanding, and on the 
ot her hand there is the implication that this 
material has its origin elsewhere. What l\ unt -vras 11 
r~ally aiming at, was the fact that we must rew · 
vise all otir thinking by considering that this 
world which seems to be eternal to us, is really ' 
not external to intelligence. only in so far as ij 
the objects are outside of one another s :pat±all~r :,· 
Thus h i s assert ion, th~t the understanding makes I 
Nature, implies that the understanding only ar-
ranges or systematizes the facts of Nature , but 
docs net create the2e facts. Kant does not des-
troy a material world, only he cla imed that this 11 
material wo rld must be referred t o the intellig-
ence f or its me anine. He re j udiat ed t he idea of 
a world beyond our minds as beine t he same as 
that of our ex:Jer i ence , and yet on the other hano. l 
he does not confine himself . to a world sim~ly of 
ideas. He was quite aware of the fac t that if he 
as s nmed a world out s ide of mind • there could be 
nc science of Nature whatever . because a pass iv-
ity of mind presup~os c s ju ~ eements concernine a 
limited number of objects of the individual ex-
per i ence. whereas a s cienc e of Nat ure, to be a 
science at alJ. , must be able to make judzements 
that are universally valid. Ae ain . if hc .remained 
~n a vrcrld of ideas, he could n ever s ay anyt hing_~--_ -~ 
I 
r 
I 
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about the nature of the v•orJ.d , for \'rhat wo uld 
be assumed as that lying outside of conscious-
ness , could not be conceiv ed as existine. He~ce 
Kant advocated t hat t he external \'1/'orld whi ch 
seems so evid ent t o common sense 1 is not ex-
t ernal to mind only in so far a s its objects 
are outside of one anot her s patiaJly , and that 
it·· was possibl e to be j us t as conscious of mat~ 
t e r as of mind. This world external in re gard 
t o its objects and consisting ·of obj e cts in 
s~ace and time, al l bound together by natural 
c·ausat icn, is t ·he world <i.f investigation f e r 
natural science. The world as we know it , or 
the s ystem of Nature. exists for and in virtu e 
of our intelligence. This saves it from being 
,a mere aggregate of isolated atoms : it is a 
complet ed whole, all parts of which imply one 
another . The r eal world i s a mechanical system, 
but it is much more. As a mechanical s ys t em , it 
is .not ultimate but presu pposes a s omething 
rat i onal be~ind it, acting as its support. Its 
who l e existence depends on a rational i ntel lig-
e nce , so t hat t he science of Nature must have 
as i ts basis , Re ason .It is only fiction wi t hout 
i t . Hence we have pos ited a Nature that is not 
self- ex::>lain:ing, but one where 111 ind and NaturG 
impl y one another , or dn ot her words, we are in 
a s~ iritualize d un iverse which is the manif est-
·ation of an I nfinite I ntelli ~enc e , and all sc i -
entifi c investigation is limited t o s uch a sys-
tem. Th is however , does not prevent us from 
know ing something about this same Infinite I nt-
elligence . 
From Kant ' s philosophy then. we get 
our cardinal insieht into a system of Nature , 
viz. that i ntellieence is the explanation of 
Nature. Before us l ies a uniformity , a co~~lete . 
=====*=- --
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whole capable of being rationally inter preted 
and, as Hegel said, a system so welded and cern~ 1 
pacted together, that it is at bottom an ident-
ical thine to say that t he annihi1ation of a 
s inr;le atom of matter, would destroy the whole J 
universe. This is the system presupvosed by the 1 
scientist as he endeavours to ascertain it s fact -
and to arran~e •hd. ~ classify ~hem. ~h~re i~ an I 
order all la:td down before h1m, a un1fornnty, a ' 
system rhich , as he stu d~es it , reveals itself I 
as a natural develo::?ement, but not one complete :1 
in itself. HcY>r applicable then are t he words of 'I 
Kant when he says , " the univ er se would sink in-
to t he abys s of nothingness. unless we admit tha~ 
besides th is infinite chain of cont ingencies, 
there exists something that is primal and self-
subsistent, s omething which •s the cause cf this 
phenomenal world secures its continuance and 
l.1reservat ion " . ~1 
With this cniform s ystem of Ratur~ 
in rnind, , we will proceed to note its naturai proJ 
~esses. Start ine with th~ ~ssumpt ion that N~tu::e I 
lS an order of lavi , one 1nuependent of the lndl-
v idual mind but not of mind , we ask what are · 
the s e lavrs r:;overnine such an order ? ~.re they 
dynamic forces or mere statements of relat i on ? 
From Naturalism we hear t he verdict 
that these J.avrs are dynamic in their nature , i.e . j 
they have po'\'rer to produce at will, what they 
wish. Behind all a::?pe arances are certain entit-
ies working themselves out in the phenomena of 
Nature so uniformly that we can predict the . 
course of events to a second, e.g. the arrival 
o6 a comet or the rise of ocean tides . The a~­
nostic naturalist continually refers to the law 
of Evolution. t he lav·r of Substance, or other 
~ --- - ~ 
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la,·rs of Nature, as if these laws were really 
powers in themselves capable of producin~ what 
they willed. But this sienificance of the term 
11 law•• is quite unscientific, and we have no 
less an authority than Prof. Huxley. a master 
in his de partment, warning us aeainst such an 
unscientific practice. He says, " it is the use 
of the word "J. aw " as i f it denoted a thine, as 
if a "law of iature", as science understands 
it, were a being endowed with certain powers 
in virtue of which , the phenomena expressed by 
that lavr , are brougLt about. All I ·wish tc rem-
arJ::: is, that such a concept icn of the nature of 
lavrs has not h t n ~ t o do with modern science". 
He proeeeds .:· lfurther to say that, " a law of 
Nature in the scientific sense, is the product 
of a mental operation upon the facts of Natu re 
which come under our observation, and has no 
more existence outside of mind than color has " 
AlJ. this imrllies that la;,·r is not a 
cause but a fact, and so we must learn laws 
from the facts presented. and not facts from I 
1 avrs. Laws 1 in thenseJ.ves, do noth ine;. If we make 
l a·~r an ar;e:ncy do i n~ someth ine, we might as weJ.J. 
say that the law of eating makes us eat, or the 
1 avr of sleeping makes us s J.eerJ. Something has 
to ha)pen before science can begin its worJ::: of 
desc r i~tion. "True scientific teaching" accord-
ing to Prof. Tait . " require~ that the facts 
and tleir necessary consequences alone. should 
be stated as simply as possible", and vre gather 
from Nevrman' s Grammar of Assent that "lavs of 
NatUl'e are s im:)ly statements of what de facto 
has always been found to cccur und.er certain 
conditions anc may consequently be expected to 
occur aeain". 
Review ing the history of science, . 
18. 
it is .to be noticed that at a certain period, 
caus es which were once regarded as eff i cient , J 
e ave vray to universal l aws which were termed 
self- existent and operated unchecked , reigning I 
su~·,reme, b indine Nature fast in fate. Law and 
fact were on the same plane , but this is cont-
rary to fact. We eet facts lone before we eet 
laws : vre do not l?!a~o lavm alread~ - at hand· ·and 
then see that fac t s are evolved fro~ them. Nat-
ural ism in its attempt to expl ain Nature, claims 
to be free from all anthropomorphism or spirit-
ual definition, and vrhen we in t roduce law as 
something outside of phenomena , it ~ ill not l{ear 
of it. I ts aim is to r ecoenize laws of Nature 
as uniformities of co-existence cr succession, 
so that the ? ar ts of the vrhole are in an order 
of relation. Hence natural l aws would seem to 
make relations , which is impossibl e. They do not 
make them but on1y state them. I n our study of 
N~ture , we can compute , can measur~ distances 
and weieh quantities . but me chani cal lm1s do 
not accomplish these thines. They are not them-
selves measures and nunbers , but because thes e 
la~rs al"e ap1)li cabJ.e , it only goes to show that 
measure and number orde r thines , or that thinzs 
are capable of beine ex?res sed in terms of num-
ber and measure. 
Tr ue it. is that Nature seems to 
be a mechanism , but its workine takes place ac-
cordine to J.aws t which are not entities in them~ 
sel ves. T ey only eo to show that the universe 
is a , finltf~ t h~ ·- re gularity of which points to a 
Supr0me Intell iz_ence , or a Prime-Ivlover. The ideal- ' 
ist ic posit ion is the sa,fest. This says that if 1 
the universe is intell izible , t.he lav1s of Nature 
are but the ways of workine or the manifestations 
of this I ntellieence in phenomena ~resented to 
our sensibility. By vievine naturc.l l aw·s as such 
----==-----
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we escape a crude worship of them, in thich they 
are regarded as more of a fetish. i mas;inine that 
·when a phenomenon is referred to a. natural l a'\'l • 
i t is explai ned. 
Such a concer,t ic n of l aw then, 
has a great bearing on the work of science. We 
c an r eadily see that s cience has nothine to do 
"t' " ' ' . ' .::1 "j' _,_ • .co· 1 I 
'lt! l · n e 11 1c .!. e r n~ c uuses) an o. 1.: ~3 0) L. il•?n. 1 ln::.l... 1 
r .,. . • t. , I J.. l - I cau::~e :J a·ce no·; conce2nect , no ·-~ ou-: .. "vi .<tl.'G 0 1.ey e:::1s · 11 
but because they do not come i nto its s~here. if ~ 
t he universe has be en made by an A1J.- Vlise I nt e l -
l i een~ Cre at e ~ , t hat doe s not concern the s cient - • 
i s t. AlJ. that concerns h i m i s , t hat before h i m 11 
lies a s ~rstem of uni f orm s equences called Nature, 1 
an d this system ev i dently extends far back in the l 
r emot e past, and is 1 ikely to extend for\'!ard in- I 
definit elt. What the scientist really aims to de 
1 
is, t o make observation and induce f r om the facts ! 
f ound, the laws governing them , or the relations I 
of their co- existence. These laws and facts com- I 
prise all the contents or scientific study. 
' I f natural law then. is not a 
causal agent but a statement of relat i on betwee n 
f acts in Nature, we are l ed to inquire concern i ng ! 
Nat ure as a cosmos or or der of developement , all I 
of wh ich im~)l ies the ~uest ion of be!:innin~s ar2.cl. 1 
t he history of things. 
One of the great est result s 
of a study of Nature, is the deep conviction t hat \ 
everything has a lone history behind it , or .as 1 
Bazehot has s a id , " everythine has become an an-
tiquity". Ev erywhere we see a transition taking 
place from;one established order of things to an-
other, one institution being transformed to an-
ot her, a ~ass ing from the simple to the complex, 
from the lower to the higher , and we sum uv the 
whole ~recess in one word , Evolution. 
20. 
This doctrine was firs t applied to human 
affairs, but l ate r became applicable to all 
forms of life, even to t he. strtl~t~re cif . the 
heavens above. I t i 8 as cl d u.s r:-•hi l SC'I=Jhical 
thinking itself, but Vlhatever might have been 
its origin , the fu ndamental idea that the pre-
sent is the child of the past and the ~arent 
o ~ the future, was certainly familiar to the 
early Greek philo~o~hers, although it never 
a. peared as a pract ical principle until the 
time of Hume and Kant. In the pr opagation of 
the doctrine of Ev olution, we recognize the 
names of Goethe , who put it into :Joet ical form. . 
Larnarck , Buffon, Gec·ffrey St. Hil aire , Era.smus 
Darwin, and in ncdern times , Charles Darwin , 
Wallace , Spen cer,Huxley and Haeckel. Through 
the labours of all these men , Evolution was 
1 
established as a scientific fact .Th d t , 
.. e .oc rine 
has been always more or less identified wi th 
Darwinism , but even if Dar 'ltrin was the first to 
a:.1)ly it as a biological lavr, to an~r ereat ex-
tent , we must not confound it '.'i' i th Darwinism. 
We are not com11elled to ·accept Dar\'rin ' s theory 
of evolution , e ven i f we do hold it to be a 
wo r kable theory in the world of life. 
I n its modern a?plication, we 
!:lUSt not ice how 1 H:e other lavrs evoJ.ut ion has 
been helc1. as a self- exist i ne law , and those who II 
are anxious to defend it as s uch, cl~im it is . 
purely scientific in its use. Haeckel,.one 6f its 
for cmc:;t advocates. in b,in chapter on evolution I 
says, " we have at least attained to a clear 
v ie··T of the f a ct, that all the partial quest ions j 
of creation are indivisibly connected, that they 
re:;?resent one single comphrehensive cosmic pr-o-
blem, and t hat the key of this problem is found 
• 
in one magic word, evolution". He reduces the 
que3tion of the origin of the world to two alt-
er nat ives, one of whic L must be accepted . On t he 
one hand, creation must have taken place b~raugh 
means of a supernatural power, or on the tther 
hand , the universe was an evolution by natural 
process according to mechanical laws. The latt er , 
he accepts a s the trv.e account of the origin of 
11 the universe, in fact of everything, and even the 
?henornena of all Nature a~e gcverned by such a 
lavr, the whole universe being an eternal evol-
ution of substance. 
However, he attributes to the 
universe a beginning, when he declares thut in 
the beginning there was a vast nebula of infinit- ' 
el y 1ttentuated · aill.d light material, and at a 1
1 
certain moment - countless ages ago - a movement 1 
of rotation was impart ed to the mass. Hence, 1 
~iven this first beg inning of the cosmogenic 
mo vement, it is easy on mechanical principles to 
deduce and. mathematically establish the fu rther 
)henomena of the foundation of the cosmic bodie~, ,, 
~he separat iorl: of the }.Jl anets etc. Thi s \fould 1 , 
im_::, l y then, that the unive rse had a beginning, 1 
but any inquisitive mind would naturally as k 
concerning the impartation of this first force 
to the primitive mass , its origin, or was it a 
forc e acting from without, or belonging to the I 
force itself. Thi s same theory is given by Spen-
cer only in 0ther terms. Spenc er advocates in h is l 
theo ry of evolt,tion, that at first there ;rae a 11 
homogeneous indefinite mass , but at a particular 
1110ment a transit ion took ::,lace by integration of 
matter and dissi~ation of motion from t his hom~ 
ogeneity to heterogeneity. The im) lication in 
both forms . of the question , as presented by 
22. 
Spencer and Hae c~el, is that of an external 
moving f orce effecting the mass, and once that 
mass is started ~hen according to mechanical 
~rinciples, there is no trouble to account for 
Nature. All accord i ng t o Goethe , proceeds by 
an iron law, and if we are in doubt about the 
truthfulness of the assert ion, we have only to 1 
refer to the t est imo n~r of Dennis Hu rd , who says ,II 
"v,: re s t in sure and certain ho pe that no force !I 
and no combination of force s can stop t he ?r e-
cess of evolution which from a speck of jelly 
has developed such livin~ forms as Charles Dur-
win and Herbert Spencer, and which has produced 
the beauty of t he earth and the heavens from 
formless et he r". 
Returnine however , to Spencer's 1 
fo :·mula, it is evident that he starts with a 
homogeneity where there is no such a thine as 
law. It is chaos, in fact it is nothd.ne, because 
without law or order , it has no meaning for an 
intelligence. But Spenc s r claims there is a 
chan~e. This is i mposs ible, unle s s there comes 
into pl ay an c·utsi de force. Such homoeene i ty 
can nev er get out of itself , i n fact it has no 
mean in~ to star t with, and Wh.J spe ak of change ?
1 The key to the exposure of 
the weakness of both t heorie s , is t he ir i dea of 
1 aw as an entity, a dynamic force doin_:: s ome-
thi!lg, thereby putting l aw on the same :Jl ane as 11 
fac t s , when laws are only statements f fhe~~ ­
relation t hat exis t s between f acts. 
We have before us then, in reg ar d 
to evolut ion, tvro alternatives , first evoJ.ut ion 
without guid ance, and second , evolution with 
guidance. The former we see illust rated in 
Haeckel and Spencer's phi l osophy of evolution, 
-· 
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where according to the mechanical view, evolution 
begins at an initial stage denoted by Spencer a~ 
the absor:.Jt ion o f ~ut :i.vn h!l :ff. con~ot1i tant dis int-
egration of matter, and ends up with a finality, 
as imr)erceptible as the former, viz. the integ-
11 rat ion of matter and concomitant d.i ss ipat ion of 
motion. Thus it is evident, he oscillates from 
one extreme t o t he other , from a laree ~otential 
enerey on the one hand, to an energy that is diz.-
1
' 
sipated e n the other hand . 
The second alternative 
is, evolution with eu.idanc&, or a teleoJ.o~ical 
view of all Nature This does not requirE: a per-
iod when develo )ement be~ins , but it s i mply acc-
e~t s enereJ, recogni z ing the fact t hat this same 
en ere ~' has a dire ct ion e i ven t o i t by inteJ.J i -
eence . Fhom mere me chanical data . the worl l i · 
wou ld naturBlJy select tle line of l east r esist- 1 
ance, and in t tme run down 1 ike a wat ch, th's 
dismissinz t he ide a of develo~ement which is 
imposs ible if blind forces are at work without 
any definite ~urpose in view. So too, we wo uld 
never be able to predict any ~henomenon that 
mi ght happen , if only blind necessity were at 
work. 
Pass i ng on to its biological applicat ion , 
ve not ice s uch names as Larrt a r c¥. and Charles Darvf i ri 
st an0 inz out :Jrominentl!r. But it i s wit h tLe lat - 11 
tor that we are :tnterested here. We must at any 
time avoid ident i fying Darwinism and evolution . 
Evol~tion i s an established f uct , with every 
evidence in it s f avour, but Darwinism is only a 
theor~r of evolution , which endeavours throueh 
t lG princi~le of natural. selection, to account 
f or t he a~·)earance of a:l.J. sr)ec i es . VIe cer :, a inly 
would not h ~ve the audacity to underestimate the 
i nunense v alue of Darvin ' s contribut i cn t o the 
b joloeicai world of knowledge , but we owe it to 
21. 
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say that his title "Oriein of s , eciec" is a 
misnc.mer. I n t hat work, , valuable as it is to 
science , he has missed t he main problem of 
oriein. He has accounted for the !_)reservation 
of t~rpe and not the arrival of the t~rpes or 
"the fit ", who en~age in the deadly strugele 
for supremacy or survival. The whole question 
is, hor do the types arrive? It i s as Prof. 
Co~e has said , "the survival of the fitteet 
does not explain t he crigin of species, until 
we explain the oriein of the fit t esp. It is 
quite evident that everywhere in Nat ure, there 
i s progressing the strueele for life, but this 
struggle has nothine to do with orieins, which 
depend on structure alone. This struesJ.e only 
deals with the distribution of these several 
I organlsms but not their origins". I 
But sim ~le as the formula of cr r~nic 
evolution may seem: when we endeavour to s;e 1 
its working, we get perplexed , even pass ing into ~ 
t he reeion of doubt and uncertainty at times. II 
But as research proceeds , every evidence 
of t he worJ.dng of this la·u of evoJ.ut ion , ap~)ears 
al thoueh vre may not knovr all a. bout the vrorking 
of this mechanism. As Huxley says aeain, "if 
the Darwini an hypothesis (of Natural SeJect ion) 
were swept away, evolution would still stand 
vrhere it vras". The fact of evoJ.ut ion is forced 
upon us 1 even although its factors 1nay be unr:Jer- 11 
ceived. The point t o be noticed is, t hat evol- " 
ution spells prggress, i t is not a matter of I 
fortuity. When ve view this progress as fortu-
itous , then \fe get into difficulty. The vhole 
of Nature is as Goethe ha ::~ said, a bool! whose 
ev e r~r page is fu1 J. of · import , o..nd as the story j 
:proceeds we see a r;radual un.foJ.dine of the mean-
ine intended by t he author.We might ?Ut it in 
• 
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the words of T.H.Green when he said that the 
world or Natur e was but th6s spiritual prin-
ciple , so man if est every'l'rhere , unfolding its-
elf in visible phenomena. 
Evolution is one of the zreatest 
evidences of the presence of a directive I nt-
ellieence workin~ itself out in all the act-
ivity of the universe. To interpret it as a 
rorkine out of blind forces in a mechanism , is 
to make it unattractive to the human mind . To 
perceive a finalit~r, a ••forward look 11 , is to 
eet a ~reater far more ma jestic conception of 
the universe, in vrhich the Great Cause is ever 
present , than to think that creation is already 
completed, or that everythin~ came into exist-
ence as the res ult of a fiat. To Dar'\fin himself 
evolution had a gre at aesthetic value, for he 
states that, "when I view alJ. be ings , not as 
special creations , but as lifiea! ~ . descendents 
of some fev; beings vrho 1 i ved before the first 
bed of the Siluri an was deposited, they s eem to 
me to be ennobled. There is a grandeur in this 
view of life , with its several povrers havine 
been originally breathed by t he Creator into a 
few forms or into one, and that while this 
planet has gone cycling on , a ccord ing to the 
fixed la'\"i of eravity , from so simple a beeinnin 
endless forms most beautiful and most wonder-
ful have been and are being evolved 11 • 
I f then this universe is a comi_)lete 
uniformity, an order of law , where is there any 
room for mir acle~? I f we conceive the world as 
a mechanism , a miracle is im?ossibl e , that is 
as we generally view miracle s as breaks or i nt -
erruptions in the workine of natural laws But 
Naturalism is not the last word in philosophy. 
We pause to as} what really.constitutes a mir-
acle. and what evidence have we that such a 
26. 
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thing has taken pl a ce or does t ake place now. 
May we not dismis s miracl es to t he region of 
myt h an t'~. The:gi:m:.d or even tradition? Goethe sato 
in writ ing to Lavater that " a vo i ce from heav-
en would not convince me that water burned . fir 
exting:u ishec1 or a dead man rose azain " . This i s 
but c aract eristic of a great deal of scient -
ific thinking : the modern s pirit of science 
s e ems to be aga im:t acl:nowled!::in~ the existence 
of any such thine as a break in the mechanism 
of Nat m.·e. I t is not whoJ.J. ~r a theoJ.oeical que s-
tion , but one of metap 1ysics as well . J .S.Mill I 
contended that t he constitution of a miracJ.e , ! 
implied a phenomenon whi ch had taken pl a ce withl 
out being preceded by antecedent phenomenal 
conditions sufficient to produce it. The test o 
a miracle he thought . was dependent on t he fact 
whether if these same condj.t icn :-::l would ar):)ear jj 
the s ame event wou ld result . I f tl 0 N·-ery s.aroe:J 
e vent waul( appear then there would be no wir- I 
acle . From such a definition , it would seem that 
a niracle means the violation of the law of 
causat ion , tltat is .. if the only r eaJ. i ty v as 
that which appeared for the senses. This i s 
evident i f we consider that only material force~ 
ar e at wor k . but i t is a fact that ue need not 
go out side of everyday experience to notice 
other than materi al forces at work . For exam-
pl e . in the will of anyone to do 2ome act , ~ 
the re is broueht into play moral forces , or we 
may s ay , the me ntal intervenes in the phys ical. 
We may t hrow a s tone u~ r ard: that very act con~ 
tradicts a law of Nat ure. especially in the 
fact of the stone go ine up , although it obeys 
t he natural law of eravitation on its return • 
This a ct on the part of the s tone is against 
natural l aw , or in other words . there i s a 
break . So in Natu re . there occur events out of 
• 
• 
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the ordinary , and becatise we cannot discern 
the ir causes J we naturally cal l them miracles. 
The lal'r of continu.'ity which is so often u.ti l iz G' d 
as evidence aea i ntt the possibility of any int-
erruption in the order of Nature , is but a ~rin­
ciple which science uses , but it cannot be con-
ceive d as a constituent principle of Nature.We 
are s o accustomed , as Prof. L~dze says , to s ee 
ev e _yt hinz running on mechani~ally . that as no 
bre ak is noticed, we aro apt to conclude t hat 
t. he w_ o1e svstem of the un i ver;:e i ~ self- ori cr' n-
. " .... 
at e d and self- s us taine d, or that it has no ulti-
mate or foreseen destiny. The vrho1e problem of 
mira cles is not one dependent on the possibility 
of a J. ine heine dr a 1n between the natt1ral and 
su:::_,ernat ural , nor· even has i t to do with the l aw 
of ca·us ality. I t can onl y be observed as a certai 
event happening ot:t of the ordinar~r whose laws 
we have not yet ascertained. No natural laws are 
violated. This directive Supreme I nte1li~ence 
which ~ives me~ning to the l'!hol c- p_np_grezs c· f Natur 
nev e r stultifys itself ·by self- contradictian , but 
on the other hand. t h is same I nteJ.li~en c e may 
choose ,o manifest Himself in ways different from 
Ylhat '.'Te are accustomed. to in every- day life and 
obs e rvance of phenomena. The very ap~earance of 
J.ife or t he gap between the oreanic and inore t.nic 
are chasms which have not beeri br id~ed yet. In · 
f a ct the whole creation is a miracl e constantly 
in :pr o'gres s . 
This question of miracle furthermore 
involves an inquiry concernine the relation of 
Nature to its author God , or the great Prime-
Mover behind alJ. :") henomena. We nat urall" incmire 
- " ;o 
whether God i s a Being apart from His work or 
creation . as Deists hold , or whether He and His 
ere at ion are ident ict."..J. with one a!!other as Pan-
theism advocates. Alre -. Ci.y there is im:Jlied in all 
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our discussion so far , that Nature is no mere 
collection of objects in space and time related 
to each other externally as if one object were 
the cause of the other • but that it is t he expr-
ess ion of a single rational ) rincir,le. This dis-
misse3 al l materialistic speculation as inadequ-
ate to ex:2lain phenomena as the wor1dng of natural I 
forces without purpose. So too the Unknowable Be- I 
in; vhi c S~~nce~ po~~t s h ~ the explruation.of al l I 
tlnnes , a Be1ng 1n wu1ch m1nd an d. matt e r un 1te or 
find t heir me aning, is rej e cted . We return t o cur ~ 
conce::?tion of God as the Sur,reme Intelligence vrh ich 
ei ves meanine to a1J. phenomena, and f o r which all 
phenonen a exist. I f we con ce ive Him as standing 
a::H!rt frm1 His wo rlr. • He is me u.n~fl.gle ss , onl~' an 
abst r hcticn or me r e form. We mus~ view Him E~ : 
:;_;rese nt in all His work • and it is this fact that 
SJ i ncz a emphasized. although his phi l osophy rev-
ealed its s hort-comd.ngs by the ado:pt ic-n of the 
post ul at e that s ubs t ance and God were the s ame 
e ntity. For him ~here was only one substance which ~ 
was it s own cause. infin i te and the only substance 1 
I' 
ci Apend ine on nothine; c~ utside i tself, but one on 1 
vrhich everything depe nde d . · 1 
This idea of God was quite dif f -
1 
erent from the concelJt ion t hat the rel ieions he lcl , I' 
but his theory cf causality was al t g gether differ- I 
ent from the usual idea of ~ausality. God was the 1
1 
cause cf the world in the sense that the fruit is · 
the cause of its co1.our or taste , a substrat un and 
not an external cause working from without as the 1 
sun would be the caus e of heat effectine the earth J 
Thu s in Sl 'inoza • z. thought, God was the i mmanent 
c<lt~se in the sense t hat he was the substratum of 
all things visible. The whole Cosmos was God and 
Gocl. ,.·as the whole Cosmos . 
I 
I. 
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The work of ideut :Lf~dn~ God and the Cosmo ::' wa.s 
laden with diff i cuJ.t ies. The en€· ere c:-~.t l lC int c,f 
S~inoza ' s t heorj of God and the universe however, I 
was that he destro~red t he possipi.lity of .an.; iaea . II 
vrhel'e in mind and matter wel'e manifestations of 1, . 
one and the same ~rinciple. The fact of t he inde- I 
pendence of an external world and finite mind;, ~ 
was of no account. ··. • Nature and mind, or thought 
and being, "tlere bound up in t he a bsolute and 
inseparable from it, so . that the world was infin-
i t e and the f i nit e lad no re ality. 
Wi~hout examining the diff iculties 
offered by s uch ~ theory of the absol ute , it is I 
sufficient to note that Pantheism and Ide alism , 
1 
though seemingly far apart, have really something I 
i!l common. Both maintain that Nature can have no 11 
re ality apart from God , and that the finite as 
h "' ,., such ~annot exist T.e dirferehce appears when on 
the one hand Pantheism clai~s that the Div i ne is 
e qually manifested in Nature and mind , resulting 
i n the f a ct that the universe may be called God 
or Nature, while on the other hand I aaalism denie~ 
that matter and mind ar e equal man ifes t at ions of 1
1
. 
the Divine , whi ch fact in borne out by the claic 
of science itself, aiming, a s it does, to present 
particular things a~~arently independent of one 
another, as related to one another in a system. 
Thus the organic unity of the world is manifest e d j 
and the whole is understood as the expression of 
an abs olutely rat ional principle. We can never I 
avoid conceiving the Divine princi :,:;le as that · .. · . · : \ 
which gives meaninz to all experience, and when 
'if e grasp that princi:>le i n a cornr_Jlete and f inal 
manifestation , then it reveals itself as self-
conscious and rational. Where Pantheism f ails is, 
when it is satis f ied with a. vague cons c ic usness 
of t h i s Divj_ne ~)rinci!Jle which 1.\t:nif,.:i;es,._a;l.l. .--rrro,5l~s. 
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of being and yet denies the same principle not 
only as a unity but as having the quality of 
self- consciousness and rationality. We must 
grasp the truth that the physical world has no 
being complete in itself : it is only a phaAe of 
the Supreme I ntellizence and as fitiit~ ~ is not 
de?rived of reality . 
As Pant he ism has em·ohas ize d 1 
t he ·mm.anence of the Creator , so Deism i1as over- ! 
emnhasized Hi s transcendence, bv acknowledaina l 
• u ~ ~ 
God as the Creator of the world but withci.!l'a\'finz 
Hi~ f r om the scene of action leaving the univ-
erse to proceed as best it may as a mechanism. 
Th is allows us to remain in the old system of 
necessity where there can be no movement or 
change whatever , and where everything is in a 
state of Heracliti c flux. 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Such a conception of God, as we I 
have established, can be safely adopted as the 1 
philosophic basis of Christianity , and is not 
at variance .with a Divine Personal i t~r '\'rhc d!s 
ab l e to manifest Hdfusefui ~ not only in natural 
phenomena, but in a Pe rson, Je sus of Naz areth , 
the lover and Saviour of humanity. 
We have noticed to some extent 
the problem of the relation of God to Nature , 
so it remains now for us to touch upon the que- 1 
st ion of man 's relation to Nature. Biologically •" 
science does no t hesitate to state his position ' 
among other living beings, for we are told that 
I 
physically man belongs to the special order of 1 
Mammals called Pr imates , in wh ich class vre find 
. the Old World Monke~rs, the Ameri c u.n Monkeys, and ,. 
the Ant hr ppoitl Apes. I t is to the latter class 11 
that man bears a st rong resemblance · from the 
str1.1ctural point of view. But even if this is l1 
true, man is a ty r1 e by himself. W 1ile many othei 
creatures show sig_s of intelligence, he alone I 
-=======- =-=-=-- - =-----=- - ---
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stands out a~ that type which has Reason as well 
a~ that one rho alone can form any concept of 
truth. 
But even if we do admit his special dis-
t inctive features differentiat ir1g him from .the 
lower brute; and at the same time acknowledge II 
h is kinship 'dth the anthr9p6id ape anatomtcally 1 
speaking, we have no right to conclude that the r e 
i s a complete affiliation. I f we conceive man as I 
a mere combination of physical at oms, an animated 1
1 clod, or a natural mechanism, then we need have I 
no controversy with the one vrho advocate s man • s 1 
ascent , morally ~s well as physically, f r om Sim- I 
ian stock. But man occu2ies a more important · 
place in this universe. True it is, he is a child 1 
of Nature as far as his body is concerne d, but if 
we leave him there , we take ~1ay all his sanctity 
and dieinity as well as all his ethical value. L 
He is truly Nature's masterpiece, a creature that 
i nvolved ages of patience and long trava2l . He I 
i s Nature ' s ripest fruit, her finest flower. Pro~ 
Lankester has rightly stated that, " man is 
held to be a part of Nature, a product of the · 
definite and orderly evolution which is univer-
sal : a being result~ng from and driven by the-
onc great nexus of mechanism". Althoueh this i s 
not the whol e truth of man , yet we can conclude 
from this that man is not merely a product of 
f ortuity, for the reason that our conception of 
Nat ure does not allow us to think that Nature 
turns out her masterpieces accidental l y~ . Man is 
more t han a phenomenon among phenomena a~ Nat-
uralism would have him. If he is an animal phys-
icaJ 1y, he certainly is t 1e one \·rith the forward 
and upward look. How applicable are the words of 
Ralphe Waldo Emerson when he says, " 0 rich and 
various man, thou palace f light and s ound, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:I 
I 
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carrying in thy senses the morning and the 
night and the unfathomable galaxy : in th~r 
+ 
brain the geometry o;~- the city of God : i n ~~~ 
thy heart the bower of love and the realms 
of right an~ wrong"~ 
Ifi our study of Nature then, I 
it is quite evident that we are either··to bel-
ieve in irrefragable l aw , as Prof. Lod~e says , 
or to accept the fact of spiritual guidance in 
all Nature. If Natu're is a system of irrefrag-
able law, then there c·an be no breaks in its 
cent inu i ty, and if, what are termed catastr9;.. 
phies, do occur, we must explain them as being 1 
reaulated bv the urinciules of unitv. But if we I ac~c~t the ~act o~ spir1tual ~uidan~e, we de hot 
reject natural law only in so far as natura __ ~ ­
laws are considered dynamic in their nature, and 
are not mere statements of relation. VIe conce i ve ~l 
Nature as a s~rstem of law, but one in which 
there are pur~ose and direction, having a def-
inite aim in all its developement, and all it s 
energy under control . At first sight, it would 
a~pear that these two views a r e o~po sed , but 
upon closer inves tigation it is found that it is 
possible to hold to both: they are consist ent 
with one another. So with the combination of 
I 
II t e t wo vi ews ~nd realizing th at we are i n a , 
"la·.,'i'- sat urated •• cosmos, we de not conce ive tllis I 
universe as being purely a ~h ibg · of motion and 
matter , nor of s pirit and s p ir it . alene , both of I 
wh ich explanations are quite inadequate in them-
s elves.We can think of this univers e as one in I 
which matter and motion are acted upon by spi~it 1 
and will, or with Prof. W~rd we can a3ree that. 
the unity and regularity of Nature l)rove that 
Nature itself is teleological in two aspects, 
- -
---
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1. it is conformable to human intelJ.i,:;Gnce, and 
2. it is ame nabl e t o human ends. 
We arrive then, at the fundament -
al doctrine of Theism, the belief in a God as the 1 
First Great Canse according to whose design the 
universe has been fashioned: a Cause whose purp-
oses 'VIe can never s:raSl) but WhOSe modes of thoughtJl 
are reflected in our own. Nature is but the work-
ing cut of a purpose in the mind of the Creator. I 
The very fact t hat Nature presents herself as 
~ossible of being conceived by inteJligence, show~ 
that it itseJ.f is intelligent. I t does not contain 
its own explanation: the very intelligence in this 
intelligi~le Nature is the same in kind and ~ual­
ity a~ ~ itj interpreter. The intellect we utilize, I 
a d the intelligible v"fhich is the conce11t of the 1 
intellect. both alike go back to the Supreme Int -
elligence as their source. jl 
With a teleolo~ical interuret - I 
ation of Nature, we are also led- to inquire
6
what I 
is the supreme end of Nature. Considering vrhat 
1 
we hav e already said about the relation of God to 
1
' 
Nature, th~ natural co~clu s ion conc~rnin~ the . H 
su:1rerne enu of Nature l.S that God H1mself is th1s 11 
end. He ruade Nature for Himself , to enjoy it and I 
to f in d in it H is sat is f act ion . I f this is so ) it ~I 
I 
mieht be objected that such a conception would 1 
destroy God' s perfect ion, or would irnr:1ly that God 
needed sometl ing t0 perfect Him. If we say that 
man is the end of Nature we narrow God' s work too 
much : we make it too anthropocentric. But real iz- I 
ing that cre ation is a gift gratuitously giv en 1 1 God is not in any way deprived of His essence, 
and so we can refer to Plato ' s idea of Goodness 
or in other vrords, moro.J. i t~r, as beine the chief 
end of Nature. I n Kant's Critique of J ude0ment, 
we see how t his f act is borne out especially in 
----=.=.. ---
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the statement that, " the most vulgar minds agree 1 
in reulvin~ that man can onlv be the finai end of 
.. ., - " 
creation as a mor ·~l' . beigz~' and. in considering 
not only man but every mo ral being in eeneraJ 1 
as the end of creat i on, we have a re ason for be-
ing warranted to regard the world as a system of 
final causes. Morality therefore, is the instru- , 
ment whereby Nature is enabled to realize in i t - 1 
self the .Absolute, or in ot her words, it is thr- I 
oueh moral ends that the Absolute or Great Author 
realizes Himself tn His work of N atur~ . 
. In our ~hilosophi s study of Nature , jl 
it has been difficult .·t o avoid touching u:Jon ,' 
points wholly belong,ng to science, but our fvnd- (l 
amental ~ostulate has been experience. We are , 
aware that the surest reality to us is our own 11 
pe rsonal agency, and it i s this agency that we I 
pr gject upon Nature, concluding from logical I=Jre- 11 
mises and observation, t hat we are in a universe 1 
in which God is an ever-present power o:1erat ing 
b~r natural laws. He is the !'real agent in Nature I' 
~nd in all natural evolution". The whole process , 
of Nature is but the Divine activity, and all the ~ 
sciences engaged in an investigation of natural ' 
proeesses are but the ~cts of think ing God's I 
thoughts after Him. This process of t houeht on 
our part. is made possible by the fact that God I 
has reproduced Himself in us as His children 
1 bearing His Divine imaee and having the same cos- ~ 
nitive principles. So we are able to know Nature 11 
and to forrnuJ.ate a science of it only because ,, 
there is a 1 ikeness betv.reen us and Nature. The I 
human mind is able to go out into the realms of 
Nature and investigate its secrets whi ch,f inding I 
out, ~ it utilizes in blessing humanity as . a whole. , 
I t is. able to t ake the world into itself, to rep-
roduce its facts, and to see how all these same 1 
35 . 
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facts hang together in an order of law. How true 
it i::=; that Nature is a boo}{ we ought to read clos..L 
' elv , for in i t we can l earn mu ch that ('roe::; to ~ ~ 
make up for us a full rich abundant life. Yet t 1is 
book is as full of mysteries as it was to the an- ~ 
cient Chaldeana or Babylonians. But amidst an. its ~enders and mysteries , we c an abide in this, that I 
God is the explanation of the world and the world 1 
is the demonstration of God. Any s~rstem of CoSino-
gony that will satisfy our intell ectual need of 
causality , must · ~)resurrJose the ·--~~'e:sse;" .. o:r the _·.e:lE-
istence of the Omnir1otent Being,- God, who ever 
r e veals Himself in His works, yet keepine watch 
above His ovrn. We can (tO no better than to .conc-
lude vr ith Lal!tarcl~, the real f ounder of the doc-
trine of organic evolution , when he sta tes that, 
" Nature not be ine inte11 igent, not ev en a beine 1 but an order o f thines , constituting a lJOWe:r.> .·sub- " 
ject to lmr • cannot therefore be God. She is the . 11 
wondrous product of His Almighty Will : and : for : 
us of all created beings , she is the irande::;t and 1 
most admira-ble. Thus the will of God , is every~ 
where expressed by the laws of Nature ~ since thes ~ 
originate from Hiro " . 
I 
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